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THE FUNCTIONS AND ORDERING OF THE THEISTIC 
ARGUMENTS IN DESCARTES' MEDITATIONS 
V£ronique Foti 
In his paper "Is the Cartesian Ontological Argument 
Defensible?"! J. William Forgie disputes Kenny's^ recon-
struction of the argument (which considers the first premise 
to be about a Meinongian "given object"), as well as any 
attempts to vindicate the argument by means of an applica-
tion of "Anselra's principled or "Descartes1 principle."1* 
Forgie holds that none of these reformulations of the 
argument can yield a conclusion with primary existential 
import * 
In this paper, I wish to argue that neither Kenny's 
interpretation nor Forgie's criticism do justice to Des-
cartes ' a priori theistic argument because they ignore a 
basic structure of Descartes' metaphysical thought: the 
equivalence of truth and being. This structure under-
lies the ordering of the theistic arguments of the Medita-
tions and the theory of essences advanced in the Firtfi 
Meditation in conjunction with the a priori theistic 
argument. We shall reveal this structure by investigating 
each of these topics. 
It ought to puzzle the attentive reader that Des-
cartes , who never tires of stressing the order of reasons 
over the order of topics (or the order of discovery over 
the order of exposition) , 5 devoted the Third Meditation 
to foiwulating complex a posteriori theistic arguments, 
only to come up with a si nip le and e le gan t argument in 
Meditation Five. Surely we cannot ascribe this peculiar 
ordering to accident or afterthought.6 We will have to 
accept Descartes' invitation to meditate along with him 
and enter into the dynamic movement of his thought. 
To do so, we must begin with the problem which leads 
Descartes to seek for theistic arguments. In the First 
Meditation, Descartes reflects that there are certain 
simple, general, self-evident truths which, when consider-
ed in themselves, resist doubt. The propositions of mathe-
matics are of this kind. Yet even these intrinsically 
indubitable truths can be doubted for an extrinsic reason: 
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in view of the "old opinion" that our entire being (hence 
our knowing) depends on an omnipotent creator. To deny 
this theory is to forfeit all possibility of grounding 
knowledge in certainty (because "this ascription of less 
power to the source of my being will mean that I am more 
likely to be so imperfect that I always go wrong").7 Y e t 
the hypothesis of a creator who is good as well as omnipo-
tent seems incompatible with the evidence that we do make 
mistakes.8 If we retain the omnipotence but deny the good-
ness of the creator, we are plunged into radical skepticism 
and must admit that we may be deceived even when we "add 
two and three, or count the sides of a square, or do any 
simpler thing that might be imagined." 
Adrift in that "deep sea" of doubt, Descartes casts 
about desperately for any certainty to cling toj for even 
one indubitable certainty would invalidate the skeptical 
hypothesis. There is, to be sure, the consciousness of 
his inalienable freedom: even if he cannot know anything, 
he can re fuse to be deceived. The deceiver seems to be 
less than omnipotent; and indeed, he cannot "bring it about 
that at the time of thinking that I am something, I am in 
.fact nothing." The cogito not only is a truth such that 
it cannot be thought of without being at the same time 
fully present to the itimd in clear and distinct apprehen-
sion; it is unique in that it is implicit in any conscious 
act. All consciousness involves self-consciousness. 
Spontaneous end inescapable conviction, however, does 
not amount to absolute certainty. The certainty of the 
cogito is a conditioned certainty; and its methodological 
fruitfulness (in yielding the principle of the truth of 
clear and distinct perceptions) is likewise conditioned. 
We must, then, establish its condition, which is the exis-
tence and perfection of God.9 
Descartes' problem thus comes into focus: it does 
appear that certain knowledge is possible; but we cannot 
establish this certainty as long as we regard the knower 
(who is a doubter, conscious of his imperfection) , or indeed 
the known, as the source of their own being. 
There are two necessary conditions of certain and 
perfect knowledge: 1. The cognitive powers of the knower 
must be adequate to their task, not intrinsically and 
irremediably out of contact with reality. 2. The known, 
i.e. the proper object of knowledge, must be immutable. 
We can have no assurance that these conditions are met un-
less wo can establish the dependence of knower and known 
on a source of being and truth whose fullness of perfec-
tion includes goodness, omnipotence, and immutability. 
To establish this, the conscious being must turn back upon itself and show that the existence of such a source, 
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and his own dependence on it are implicit in the primary 
certainty of the cogito, in his own self-awareness. Des-
cartes thus turns inward and ranks his ideas according to 
their degree of representative reality. He realizes!" that 
his "conception of a supreme God, eternal, infinite, 
omniscient, almighty, and Creator of all that exists be-
sides himself" transcends, in its degree of representative 
reality, the inherent reality of any finite being and thus 
must be referred to the very being it represents as its 
complete efficient cause. 
> Descartes' argument hinges on the ineluctable (although 
not necessarily explicit) presence of God to the human mind 
through the representative reality of an innate idea. This 
presence will be presupposed by his a priori argument. 
I have no doubt that all men have in themselves at 
least an implicit idea of God, i.e., a potentiality 
of being explicitly aware of the idea; nevertheless 
I should not be surprised if the idea never came 
before their awareness or attention, even if they 
read my Meditations a thousand times.H 
Descartes' point is that the representative reality of an 
idea is "not nothing" and must be causally explained. The 
idea of God, considered objectively, is shown to be non-
fictive by its independence of the finite mind. Neither 
can it be classed among our ideas of "given objects" be-
cause these (e.g., our ideas of mathematical objects) 
can all be referred to the finite mind as their total 
effecient cause. 12 Descartes' careful demonstration of the 
uniqueness of this idea prepares the ground for Iiis a priori 
argument and must not be overlooked. 
The idea of God, whose degree of representative reality 
causally implies the actuality of its object, shows itself 
to be the condition of possibility of the cogito; it grounds 
and validates the cogito which heretofore had only immediate, 
intuitive certainty. Our ideas of finitude and imperfection 
which are involved in self-awareness presuppose the ideas 
f of infinity and perfection constitutive of our apprehension \ of God. The order of knowing is the order of being.13 
. II y a done re conn u son imperfection par la per-
\ fection de Dieu. Et bien qu'il ne l'ait pas fait 
explicitement, il l'a fait pourtant implicitement. 
Car, explicitement> nous pouvons connaitre notre im-
perfection avant la perfection de Dieu, parce que nous 
pouvons faire attention ä nous avant de faire attention 
a Dieu, et con dure ä notre finitude avant de con dure 
ä son infinitude; mais, implicitement, la connaissance 
de Dieu et de ses perfections doit toujours pre*ce*der 
la connaissance de nous-mömes et de nos imperfections. 
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Car, dans la rfialitS, la perfection infinie de Dieu 
est antSrieure a not re imperfection, parce que not re 
imperfection est dSfaut et negation de la perfection 
de Dieu; or, tout dSfaut, comma toute negation, 
presuppose la chose dont eile est un dSfaut et une 
negation A1* 
Far from being fictive or from representing a "given object" 
comprehensible to the finite mind, the apprehension of God 
reveals itself as the condition of possibility of our self-
knowledge and, indeed, of our awareness of any finite 
reality whatever (as the infinite reality which it repre-
sents is the cause of all that is). 
Descartes goes on to argue that God is not only the 
cause of the representative reality of this foundational 
idea, but the cause of the finite being itself which has 
the idea. 
Descartes' argument moves from the order of knowing 
to the order of being, exemplifying, at the same time, 
the order of reasons. His argument that the finite self, 
even if eternal,!5 must depend for its continued existence 
on the sustaining creativity of God, can succeed only 
given that we have an idea of God which enables us to 
infer the actuality of its object.*6 
When Descartes concludes his Third Meditation, he 
has reached a plateau of assurance and insight which 
calls to mind St. Anselm's exultation in the Proslogion.17 
He acknowledges no doubt about having proved the actuality 
of the perfect (hence supremely good and omnipotent) 
God. Since the knower has been shown to depend on God 
for his being and knowing, his cognitive powers cannot 
be intrinsically deceptive but must be disclosive of 
reality or truth. How does Descartes conceive of truth? 
Gewirth18 has argued that Descartes thinks of truth 
as conformity of thought to object, basing himself on a 
letter to Mersennei9 where Descartes writes that truth 
requires no definition but that we may convey the 
signification of the word "truth" as conformity of thought 
with its object. I think we must make the stronger claim 
that Descartes perceives an equivalence between truth 
and being. 
Gewirth cites another text (whose compatibility with his own interpretation is doubtful): "When we say that some atttibute [quid! is contained in the nature or con-cept of a thing, it "is the same as if we were to say that the attribute is true of the thing or can be affirmed of it."20 The clearest text is probably that of a letter to Clersclicr of 16U9: 
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La verite consiste en l'Ötre, et la faussettf au 
non-etra seulement^ en sorte que l'idee de l'infini, 
coraprenant tout l'etre, comprend tout ce qu'il y a 
de vrai dans les choses, et ne peut avoir en soi 
rien de faux, encore que d'ailleurs on veuille 
supposer qu'il n'est pas vrai que cet etre infiui 
exxste.2* 
If human thought can attain truth it can attain 
being which is not simply the being of being thought and 
need not be actual. All truth is being; hence error must 
be explained as a privation and ascribed to the knov/er 
in his freedom and finitude. He can be shown to have 
access to truth in that we can be shown to depend on 
existent Perfection which, as fullness of being, is full-
ness of truth. Given this dependence, we can validate 
clear and distinct perception (taken objectively) ; "for 
every clear and distinct perception is_ something; so it 
cannot come from nothingness but must have God as its 
author; God, I say, the supremely Perfect, who it is 
absurd should be deceitful; therefore it is indubitably 
true."22 The truth or being which thought attains is the 
truth of essences which are the proper objects of knowl-
edge. However, it is not enough to show that the knower 
can penetrate to reality and attain truth; he must be 
able to reach truths he can hold on to". We need perfect, 
not just certain knowledge which requires that the essences 
be stable, indeed, immutable. 
Since the essences, like the knower, depend entirely 
on God for their reality or truth, Descartes must return 
to a consideration of God's being and nature. For this 
reasoni the a priori argument of the Fifth Meditation is 
inseparable from the problematic of essences. Wc will 
do a brief analysis of Meditation Five to uncover the 
purpose, structure, and presuppositions of this argument. 
The Fifth Meditation opens on a note of confidence: 
knowledge is possible and we know how to achieve it ("I 
have now observed what I must do and avoid so as to attain 
truth"). As soon, however, as we turn away from the self-
certainty which is inseparable from our being, and from 
the existence of God known implicitly in that primary 
certainty, we have to admit to difficulties regarding 
the object of knowledge. Knowledge once again seems to 
have found a way of eluding our grasp.23 
Insofar as we know external objects, we know them in 
terms of their mathematical determinations of essences of 
which we have innate ideas. In his act of knowing, the 
knower reaches reality (reale aliquid) which is of the 
order of possibility rather than aeutality.2I* 
12 
We may note at this point that Forgie's rendering 
of "Descartes' principle" does not adequately express 
Descartes1 thought on account of the parenthetical 
clause "though it need not exist, even in thought". 
The essences (or real and immutable natures) are indeed 
independent of existence and of our thought, but only 
because they are independently real, being possibles, 
not because they are intrinsically nonentities. They 
delimit the structure of possibility and are real because 
they are true" . . . they are something, not mere nothing-
ness; for it is obvious that whatever is true is something; 
and I have already abundantly proved that whatever X 
clearly perceive is true,"25 Forgie's failure to dis-
tinguish between being or reality, actual existence, and 
being an object of thought clouds the transparency of 
Descartes' reasoning. 
The very dependence of the essences on God, the source 
of being and truth, which allows us to have confidence in 
our cognitive abilities also gives rise to a problem which 
becomes the focus of Meditation Five, the problem of the 
eternal truths. If the essences are creatures and all 
possibility, no less than the actuality it delimits, 
depends wholly on the free will of an omnipotent God, we 
seem to have no assurance that the essences will remain as 
we apprehend them.26 Without a guarantee of the stability 
of the object of knowledge, perfect knowledge is impossible. 
We require, then, a full realization of the necessity 
involved in God's being and nature. If perfect knowledge 
is to be possible, the truth that God exists and is per-
fect (hence good, omnipotent, immutable, etc.), which was 
apprehended with certainty, cannot be an ontologically 
dependent truth like the truths of mathematics, but must 
be unconditionally necessary. This realization cannot be 
attained by a posteriori reasoning, because such reasoning 
is discursive and thus begs the question: it assumes that 
throughout the laborious process of reasoning and in-
definitely thereafter (when we remember having formulated 
a proof without having the proof itself present to our 
mind) intelligible structures will remain exactly as we 
apprehended them. 
The realization must be not only a priori but as im-
mediate and intutitve as was the realization of the primary 
certainty of the cogito..27 Descartes does not specify the 
premises or underlying principles of his a priori argument 
(as he did in the case of the a posteriorT arguments) , 
because this argument presents an intuitive realization. 
What follows from this realization? We cannot com-prehend the Divine nature, but whenever we apprehend it clearly and distinctly, as a possible, in its fullness of 
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reality (knowing that we are apprehending a genuine 
nature), we see at once that it is necessarily actual 
and conjoins all perfections in its unitary simplicity. 
The Divine decrees are immutable because, although they 
are free, no real distinction separates them from the 
necessary structure of Divine Perfection.28 They are 
thus freely created, yet necessary and immutable. 
Descartes warns that this is incomprehensible to our 
reason. 29 Far from being an arch-rationalist trapped 
in the realm of Pure Objects, Descartes, like Anselm, 
avows that the truth of the fons yeritatis transcends 
the comprehension of the created intellect. 
Only now has Descartes achieved a full validation 
of human knowledge, so that he can take his stand 
against the skeptics and proclaim: 
But now I have discerned that God exists, and 
have understood at the same time that everything 
else depends on Elm and that he is not deceitful; 
and from this I have gathered that whatever I 
clearly and distinctly perceive is necessarily 
true. So even if I am no longer attending to 
the arguments for having judged this to be true, 
yet, so long as I remember that I did perceive it 
clearly and distinctly, no contrary argument can 
be brought forward to induce me to doubt it; I 
have genuine and certain knowledge of the matter. 
My knowledge extends not only to this, but also 
to everything else that I remember I have proved— 
in geometry and so on.30 
We may now summarize and enumerate the points in 
which the preceding analysis differs from Forgie's. 
1. Kenny's assimilation of Descartes' real and 
immutable natures to Meinongian "given objects" which 
are "beyond being and not-being" is misleading. 
Descartes is not anticipating "the principle of the 
independence of Sosein from Sein." For Meinong, every 
"object," in that it can be the subject of true predica-
tion, has Sosein, whether or not it has any kind of 
being whatever. Thus even an impossible object has 
Sosein. Descartes, on the other hand, equates truth 
with being, so that only the real can have a nature 
and the properties which belong to that nature. Clear 
and distinct perception attains truth in that it attains 
being. 
2. In a passage cited by Forgie, Kenny writes: 
"A pure object can have properties whether or not it 
exists; but if we are inquiring about its properties, 
one of the most interesting questions we can ask is 
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'does it exist or not?"* 3 1 For Descartes, in fact, 
that is not a question we can, in this context, ask at • 
all, because, since he holds that the actualization of 
an essence leaves that essence unchanged, the existence 
of a thing cannot be included among its properties.32 
One might think that this would invalidate his a priori 
theistic argument; in fact, however, i t makes i F clear 
that the argument's primary intention is not to prove 
the existence of God but the necessity involved in 
God's being and nature.33 
3. The a priori argument of Meditation Five 
presupposes the a posteriori arguments of the Third 
Meditation which establish, a. The idea of God 13 
non-fiotive (hence to ascribe the fullness of perfection 
to God is not to make a "primary" or "secondary" asser-
tion about a fietive entity), h. The idea of God must 
be referred to the reality it represents as its total 
efficient cause (hence God is not an ens rationis)• 
c. The idea of God, considered representatively, is 
unique, in that other essences of which we have clear 
and distinct ideas require no cause beyond the finite 
mind and, unlike the Divine essence, are comprehensible 
to the finite mind. Our idea of God is hence not the 
idea of a "given object" such as a triangle. 
H. The a priori theistic argument also presupposes 
the following~consequence of the arguments in Meditation 
Three: d. Since God is actual and is the fullness of 
reality and truth, we depend on God for our being and 
knoviing and can, by means of our clear and distinct 
peinception, attain reality or truth. 
S. The a priori theistic argument is not, in 
fact, an instance of formal, deductive reasoning, but 
the expression in language of an immediate, intuitive 
insight, paralleling the insight of the cogito. 
Given, then Descartes' equivalence between truth and 
reality, he is justified in holding that whatever we 
clearly and distinctly perceive to pertain to the true 
and immutable nature of a thing can be truly affirmed of 
that thing. The truths of essences delimit possibility, 
which is a level of reality, and to which all existence 
must conform. Descartes does not reason from his 
conception of a fictive being, a being of reason, or a 
"given object" to the existence of this object, but from 
his apprehension of the real, true, and immutable nature 
of God to the necessity of God's existence. His 
reasoning presupposes the recognition, set forth in 
Meditation Three, that the presence of God to the human 
mind through the representative reality of an idea, 
which is a precondition of thought, implies the Divine 
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actuality and allows us to assert with confidence that 
our clear and distinct perceptions disclose reality. 
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Mersenne, April and May 1 6 3 0 . See also smile Brehier, 
"The Creation of the Eternal Truths in Descartes' System," 
in Willis Doney, ed., Descartes: A Collection of Critical 
Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1 9 6 7 7 7 Pp. 1 9 2 - 2 0 9 . Cf. the following text: 
"Objection. Mais d'ou viennent ces idees des choses 
possibles, qui pre'ee'dettt la volonte*?" 
"Response. Ces choses et toutes les autres dependent do 
Dieu; car sa volonte n'est pas seulement la cause des 
clioses actuelles et futures, mais aussi des choses 
possibles et des natures simples, et rien ne peut ou ne 
doit etre imagine que nous disions ne pas d£pendre de 
Dieu." 
"Tout ce qui peut etre concu clairement et distinctcmont 
dans la chime re est un etre vrai, et non pas fictif, 
parce qu'il a une essence vraie et immuable, et cette 
essence vient aussi bien de Dieu que 1'essence actuelle 
des autres choses. Mais on dit d'un etre qu'il est 
fictif, quand nous supposons qu'il existe. C'est ainsi 
que toutes les demonstrations des ntath€maticiens portent 
sur des et res et sur des objets vrais, et que l'objet 
tout entier des mathematiques, avec tout ce qu'elles y 
considerent, est un etre vrai et reel et a une vraie et 
reelle nature, non moins que l'objet de la physique 
elle-meme . . , ." (Entretien avec Burman, p. 137«i) 
27Three texts explaining the intuitive nature of the 
cogito may be found in AG, pp. 2 9 9 - 3 0 1 . 
2 8 " . . . bien que Dieu soit indifferent a l'Sgard 
de tout, il a cependant decrete nScessairentent, pnrce 
qu'il a voulu necessairement le meilleur, bien qu'il ait 
fait le meilleur de sa propre volonte*; il ne faudrail 
pas ici separer la nficessitfi et 1'indifference dans les 
decrets de Dieu, et bien qu'il ait agi d'une manitre 
tres indifferente, il a pourtant agi d'une mani&ro tr*s 
ne cess aire. D'ailleurs, merae si nous concevons que ces 
decrets ont pu etre separes de Dieu, nous le concevons 
seulement par 1 ' indication et par les demarches de la 
raison, ce qui introduit a la vSritfi une distinction 
mentale entre les dScrets de Dieu et Dieu lui-m&me, mais 
non une distinction reelle, de telle Sorte que, dans la 
realite, les decrets de Dieu n'auraient pu etre s6parc"e 
de Dieu . . . ." (Entretien avec Burman, p. 138'l) 
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3 0AG, p. 107; AT, p. 70 (emphases added). 
31Kenny, p. 110. 
32Gassendi takes Descartes to task for treating 
existence as a perfection (Objections V, HR, II, p. IBB), 
and Descartes replies "I do not, nevertheless, deny that 
existence is a possible perfection in the idea of a tri-
angle^ as it is a necessary one in the idea of God; for 
this fact makes the idea of the triangle one of higher 
rank than the ideas of those chimerical things whose 
existence can never be supposed (Replies to Objections V, 
HR, II, pp. 228-29). The point is that possibility of 
existence as well as necessity of existence are perfec-
tions, whether or not a possibility is actualized makes 
no difference to the essential structure; but what is 
unconditionally necessary is always actual. Hence Des-
cartes ' a priori argument is not contradicted by his con-
viction that "the idea represents the essence of the thing, 
and if something is added to or subtracted from it, it is 
forthwith the idea of something else" (HR, II, p. 220), 
which would imply that actual existence cannot be a 
property of essences. 
3 3 " . . .we must distinguish between possible and 
necessary existence, and note that in the concept or idea 
of everything that is clearly and distinctly conceived, 
possible existence is of God alone. For I am sure that * 
all who diligently attend to this diversity between the 
idea of God and that of all other things, will perceive 
that, even though other things are indeed conceived only 
as existing, yet it does not thence follow that they do 
exist, but only that they may exist, because we donot 
conceive that there is any necessity for actual existence 
being conjoined with their other properties; but, because 
we understand that actual existence is necessarily and at 
all times linked to God's other attributes, it follows 
certainly that God exists" (Replies to Objections I, 
HR, II, p. 20). 
